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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TONYIA B# JENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLARK EVON JENSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant# 
Case No. 11458 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent agrees with appellantfs statement as to the dis-
position of the case in the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the court affirm the lower court's 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The decree of the lower court dissolved a marriage of twenty-
one and one-half years duration. Three children were born as issue 
of the marriage. The oldest child, a girl, was 18; the second child, 
a girl, was a few days short of 16; and Tony, the boy, was nine and 
one-half. 
The parties were married when the husband was 20 and the wife 
was 16. At the time of the marriage the husband was a high school 
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graduate, and the wife was still in high school. After the mar-
riage the husband wenc on continuing four years of technical 
training at the technical college. (Tr. 7)* The wife continued on 
with her education and obtained a degree in nursing and practiced 
as a registered nurse. (Tr. 7). Twenty of the 21 years the parties 
were married the wife worked outside of the home. (Tr. 7). The 
parties income was never big, but the wife took a real estate course 
at Stevens Henager College, and then engaged in real estate trans-
actions. The wife claims that this is how their money was accumu-
lated. (Tr. 12)
 # 
The marriage deteriorated to the extent that the wife was 
threatened with guns and physical violence. (Tr. 9). 
Paragraph four of the Findings of Fact, states: 
"The Court finds that the marriage between the parties 
has deteriorated because the difference in interests and 
goals which have developed between the parties over the 
past years, and that the differences in the plaintiff 
seeking work outside the home and the defendant demanding 
domestic obedience and service from her have caused mental 
and physical anguish and suffering to both parties entitling 
each to a decree of divorce from the other.11 
It was suggested at trial that both parties should be awarded 
a divorce. (Tr. 46). The court found that certain property had beei 
acquired during the marriage and distributed the property approximate 
equal between the parties. (To visualize refer to Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 6,) * 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING PROPERTY AND CASH 
TO THE PLAINTIFF IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO FIFTY (50%) PERCENT 
OF THE TOTAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING THEIR 
MARRIAGE? 
f,When a decree of divorce is made the court may make such 
• ' - 2 -
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orders in relation to the children,1 property and parties,
 0 . . 
as may be equitable," Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953)* 
This court has said repeatedly that each divorce case is a unique"', 
fact situation and that the lox^ er courts are permitted to do that 
which is equitable and just within the broad range of facts presented 
to them. 
In a per curiam opinion by this court, Anderson v. Anderson, 
18 U.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192, it was said that: 
The court frequently emphasized that fno firm rule 
can be uniformly applied in all divorce cases, * * * each 
must be determined upon the basis of the immediate fact 
situation. * * * Recent pronouncements of this court, 
and the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect that 
the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion 
in such matters and that his judgment should not be 
changed lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it works 
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a 
clear abuse of discretion.' 
The extent of this discretion is emphasized by the 
great disparity of results allowed in differing factual 
situations. In Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 pu 19 
38 L.R^A.NfS., 269 (1912), the court upheld a property 
division awarding $40,000 to the husband and $4,500 to 
the wife, even though the divorce had been granted in 
her favor. At the other extreme, in Wilson v. Wilson, 
5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956) where fthe court 
awarded her substantially all of the property possessed 
by the parties1 (in excess of $20,000 to the wife and 
approximately $500 to the husband), the decree was also 
affirmed. The court has sustained the one-third, 
two-thirds property division used by the trial court 
in the present case, without regard to which party was 
granted the divorce. Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 
195 P.2d 743 (1948); Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 
55 P 84 (1898) (In Griffin this proportion was approved 
by analogy to the rights of the widow to succeed to 
one-third of her deceased husband's estate at common law). 
This case indicates the outward extremes which have been approved 
by the court as well as the middle ground of the one-third, 
two-thirds property division. All of this, however, is prefaced 
by the thought that there can be no firm rule in divorce cases 
because of the diversity of facts and the discretion of the court 
with respect to those facts. 
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This court in Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 697, approved an 
award to a wife of real and personal property, in lieu of permanent 
alimony, representing approximately one-half of the property 
accumulated during 27 years of marriage. 
In the case now being considered by the court, Tonyia Jensen 
had worked outside the home and contributed her earnings toward 
the estate accumulated, and further had taken a course in real 
estate management and according to her testimony, which was not 
disputed by the defendant, most of the estate the parties had was 
accumulated by dealing in real property. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Rule 59 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on 
all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings, 
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment; 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having 
a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general 
or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted 
to them by the court, by reaort to a determination by chance 
or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by 
the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against:. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
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diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice* 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for Motion, A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the 
judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application 
for a new trial is made under subdivision (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a 
motion for a new trial is based upon affidvits they shall 
be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days 
after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. 
The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits 
shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court 
may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order 
a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted 
a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days 
after entry of the judgment. 
Respondent's position to appellant's claim of error in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial is that the evidence is sufficient 
to justify the decision and if specific errors of law are claimed 
such errors should be pointed out. 
Appellant says in affect, maybe my evidence wasn't strong enough 
at the trial to persuade the judge, but if you will give me another 
chance I'll produce better evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court handled in a fair and equitable manner the 
property distribution in this case 
Respondent feels that the trial court has rendered a fair result 
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for both p a r t i e s and would , the re fo re , ask t h i s court to affirm 
the judgment. 
Respectfully sub le t t ed , 
r
 -KLS "U 
,»€£&:* /A K^r^-r* W^^^W^^Z " " 
I^Jj^-crYOUiN'G 2 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 375-3000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) r 
Ruth Nehring being first duly sworn, 
says: That she is employed in the office of IVIE & YOUNG, 
Attorneys herein for Plaintiff and Respondent, 
that she served the attached Brief of Respondent 
upon Supreme Court and Defendant 
by placing a correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to; 
Michael Kodak, Jr* 
Supreme Court Clerk 
State Capital Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Gary H. Weight 
Attorney at Law 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
That she deposited the same, sealed with first class 
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Prove, 
Utah, on the j[0 day of June, 1976< 
tJt ^ J Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jo ~ day of 
June, 1976. 
dcL^m yjiu&jL^ 
EOTARTTPUBLIC ' 
Residing in Utah County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: S""jS'?f 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
